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SUMMARY
In June 2005, the Supreme Court in a Five to Four Decision marked its most controversial
decision in recent memory. The case of Kelo v. City of New London, set off a fire storm of
response to the Court’s ruling that economic development takings satisfied the fifth amendment.
This essay is about Kelo. But it is also about more than Kelo. It is about how the Court uses
words, how the defining ability of words creates institutional space in which the Court operates,
and which defines things beyond the words.
ESSAY
Words by their nature define things and events through an agreed upon convention of
meaning.

We don’t argue with each other whether “and” is a conjunction that joins or

distinguishes – the rules that govern such determinations were established a long time before we
began using the medium of conversation and composition that we use. What we argue over,
then, more often than not, is the way structure creates new definitions for words -- how prose
defines the words around it in a way that creates new meaning.
The problem with words, their definitions, and manufactured meanings within structures,
is their finitude. James Boyd White described the frustration of casting humanity in limited
vocabulary:
The lawyer must face the reality of her client’s experience, and the
fact that it can never adequately be cast into the language the
lawyer is given to speak: the suffering, the uncertainty, the
frustration, the sense of the story from the client’s point of view,
can never be adequately represented in language, without loss or
distortion. Nonetheless, the lawyer’s job is to find a way to talk
about this experience in the language of the law; this means that
she is always thinking about that language itself, what it can do,
what it can be made to do, and what its limits are.1
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James Boyd White, What We Know, 10 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LIT. 151, 152 (1998).

In other works, he has described this process as a rhythm between hope, disappointment, and
acceptance2 and as an analogue to translation3 as a means of understanding the limits of
language.
Despite the finite nature of language, language does create powerful and moving images.
Words are intended to create meaning that etch into the readers subconscious concrete images.
Words are a metaphysical tapestry, creating in space that does not exist, images that do not exist,
but which are strong and malleable, boundless and bounded for the reader to grasp onto. Much
of the way that we perceive words depends on the context of our surroundings. I will give an
innocuous example. If I say the phrase “St. Elmo’s Fire” several images could come to mind.
One may be the image of the 1985 movie by the same name, its cast of characters, or one
particular character that the reader identifies with. One might hear in the recesses of his mind
the St. Elmo’s Fire love song with its powerful piano rifts or the song Man in Motion by John
Parr which references the same phrase. One may picture the significant person they first saw the
motion picture with or if the reader attended Georgetown University or lived in the Georgetown
area of Washington, DC, he may picture Tombs, the bar that the mythical St. Elmo’s bar
mimicked. If one were scientific, he might instead think of the “Corona” effect given to objects
when lightning strikes, leaving a purple glow about the edges of the object. If one were a sailor,
he may think of the person St. Elmo and the effect of St. Elmo’s fire; St. Elmo is the patron
saint, and the “fire” (Corona) is a sign of his protection. And other images unknown to me
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James Boyd White, The Rhythms of Hope and Disappointment in the Language of Judging, 70 ST. JOHN’S
L. REV. 45, 46 (1996) (“Legal Language seems to have [a rhythm that moves from hope to disappointment
to acceptance] on a sharpened and clarified form…that is: as the utterance of a sentence holds out a
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universal language in which universal truths are uttered.”).

probably appear for others. The common link between all of these images is an experiential
contact with the phrase “St. Elmo’s Fire” that makes the word have a particular meaning to that
person.
One obvious conclusion from the example given above is that words tend to implicate
people, places, and events within the imagination. Obviously, the images are not real; they are
instead our perceptions of the images that we retain within our minds. Constitutional words tend
to work under the same limitations, except that they imagine people and places within specific
institutions.4 “We the People of the United States” directs our minds not only to a specific group
that ordained our government, but to the places it ordained, and the actual signing of the
documents in 1787. Imagining Constitutional things brings about the same hazzards that occur
when mere words produce images: they can be deceptive, luring our emotions, shared mythical
perceptions, and aspirations into a realm where words are redefined towards catatonic trances or
ecstatic delusions of what those words “should” mean.5 Said slightly differently, we can become
4

Consider Ronald Rotunda’s description of the struggle over words within American political discourse:
Though all widespread symbols are important, certain symbols, at various times, carry
particular significance. In fact, much of the United States political history can be
interpreted as a rivalry for the possession of certain words. In the early days of our
republic, the Hamiltonians – those in favor of a strong national government – called
themselves Federalists, though at that time “federation” meant what confederation means
today. The “true-federalists” found themselves at a tactical disadvantage: they were in
the position of arguing against federalism because they had accepted the label “AntiFederalist.”
RONALD ROTUNDA, THE POLITICS OF LANGUAGE 9 (1986).
5
Consider James Boyd White’s description of the phrase “We the People” within the Constitution:
In what sense was it in fact “the People” who spoke there? Of course the document was
ratified in each of the states, at conventions assembled for that purpose; in this sense, it
was indeed the act of the People. But who was permitted to vote for representatives at
those conventions? Certainly not slaves; in most states certainly not African Americans
and Indians; certainly not women; in most states nobody who failed to meet certain
property qualifications. Does this mean that the statement “We the People” is false and
hypocritical? In one sense the answer is yes. But would is really have been better if the
Constitution said, “We, the voting population of propertied white males, do hereby ordain
and establish the Constitution of the United States?”
Rhythms, supra note 2, at 47.

euphorically affixated on a particular meaning while other meanings tend to silently fade into the
background noise of our own interpretations. Those meanings we affix therefore become as
sacred and as passionate as our perceptions of the document itself.

You rarely hear someone

blandly say that their Amended Rights of Freedom of Speech Composed in 1787 have been
violated; it’s an excited declaration that “MY FIRST AMENDMENT CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
WERE TRAMPLED UPON.”

Interpretations of the Constitution that don’t vindicate our own rights

are rarely relevant.
That is why the public response to Kelo v. City of New London is so interesting. Decided
in June 2005, Kelo found that the city of New London’s economic development plan, which
authorized the use of eminent domain to take land from one private owner and give it to another,
was constitutional. Notably the named plaintiff, Sussette Kelo contended that because the home
they were living in, and the neighborhood they occupied was not a public nuisance, the public
use doctrine did not apply, and therefore the act was unconstitutional.

The overwhelming

feeling regarding Kelo is that the Supreme Court decision is an assault on property rights in
general, not just Ms Kelo’s. In large measure, this idea is due to the Constitutional imaging in
both the majority and the dissenting opinions of the case.
This essay explicates this tension described between imaging and defining constitutional
standards and places within the Kelo decision.6 On one level, this could be done by analysing
the responses to the Kelo decision, how academics described the case, its fallout and
implications. For example, Richard Epstein commented that:
Kelo galvanized the public at large because [it] unified the
progressives with the classical liberals as few issues can. The
6
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progressives who believe in community were hard-pressed to see
how New London and its development corporation were anything
other than the usual conspiracy of the rich and the powerful against
the common man. The classical liberals were only strengthened in
their belief that this sorry episode showed the dangers of faction
and rent seeking that only a strong system of property rights can
effectively resist.7
The images created by Epstein’s second hand commentary certainly tell us something about
Kelo.8 It galvanized the public. It unified progressives and classical liberals.

Moreover, his

definitions of political orientation create spaces for determining how one reacts to Kelo. He
signals that there are two responsive groups -- of progressives and classical liberals -- that orient
the reader towards the interpretive affiliation she may approach this constitutional problem with.
Other phrases such as “conspiracy of the rich and powerful against the common man,” and
“strong system of property rights” tell us something about the orientation by which those groups
generally respond to constitutional problems. But importantly, the words tell us little about Kelo
itself: they are perceptions of what Kelo did and who it affected, not of Kelo itself. Such
commentaries only tell us about the reactions to the rhetoric.

7
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GREEN BAG 2D 355, 357 (2005).
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Similar problems that could be analyzed is how active speech – acts meant to communicate – reflect the
same tension. For example, the ways that one citizen’s protest has been characterized within the media
raises certain vernacular intrigues. The WorldNET Daily internet news source described the application
that the individual, one Logan Darrow Clements made to the Town of Weare regarding Justice Souter’s
property: Wrote Clements: although this property is owned by an individual, David H. Souter, a recent
Supreme Court decision, Kelo v. City of New London, clears the way for this land to be taken by the
government of Weare through eminent domain and given to my LLC for the purposes of building a hotel.
The justification for such an eminent domain action is that our hotel will better serve the public interest as it
will bring in economic development and higher tax revenue to Weare." The article goes on to describe
Clement’s plans for resort amenities including “the Just Desserts Café,” and a museum to the loss of
freedom in America. “Instead of a Gideon's Bible in each room, guests will receive a free copy of Ayn
Rand's novel ‘Atlas Shrugged.’" See Ron Strom, This Land was Your Land: Supreme Court Justice Faces
Boot from Home; Developer wants Lost Liberty Hotel built upon property of David Souter (June 28, 2005)
at http://worldnetd aily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=45029.

In contrast, this essay takes a very limited approach. It asks what are the images induced
by notions of place and space within the Kelo opinions. That is, how do members of the court
define particular images, and what do those images mean for understanding Constitutional
doctrines of “Economic Development Takings, and “public use” versus “private use.” A key
method used in this analysis is to define two terms of art – place and space, and then to
distinguish between the ways members of the court define place and space within the opinion.
The essay suggests that the significant moves reflected in Kelo is the abstraction of
particularized locations (place) and to particularize abstract locations (space). The value of this
exercise is to reflect upon what can be imagined by reading and writing Constitutional words. Do
they in fact picture concrete places such as “homes,” “roads,” and “public buildings.” Or are
they more spatial, defining ideas instead of things.
The essay concludes with no satisfactory answer. Indeed, any conclusion that I may offer
regarding economic development takings is likely moot, given the recent Congressional moves
to limit Kelo.9 Additionally, because I subscribe to a Constitutional methodology that values the
date of the opinion as the most telling aspect of the case10 – this essay does not attempt to make
an argument styled as “the trends of the court” or to develop a post-modern theory of
Constitutional law. What it does offer is a pedagogical exercise that calls our attention to the
way the Supreme Court uses images in one particular Constitutional case.
A.
9

Defining Place and Space

The proposed Bipartisan Private Property Protection Act (BIPPRA) states that “In the wake of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of New London, abuse of eminent domain is a threat to the
property rights of all private owners, including rural land owners. H.R. 4128 § 9(4) (109th Congress 2005).
It proposes to restrict state and local eligibility for federal development funds if that state or local
government misuses the Eminent Domain Power.
10
See H. JEFFERSON POWELL, A COMMUNITY BUILT ON WORDS, 3 (2002).

I want to start with a basic definition of space and place and then give an example. Space
is an area occupied by persons or things, ideas, or institutions. Place is the particularized
location within space.

Suppose I wanted to describe a specific building. The first step is to

create the basic structure: the building. Next, adjectives, such as colour and size could be added
to give further expression: the large brown building. I could also add surroundings to my
description to further describe the scenery: the large brown building, with a flush green lawn,
spacious parking lot, and bustling court yard. Agreed upon markers of location is another aspect
that helps define my description: On Science Drive, the large brown building, with a flush green
lawn, spacious parking lot, and a bustling court yard. Finally, I might add something about the
building’s purpose, activity or meaning: the Duke University law school was housed on Science
Drive in a large brown building with a flush green lawn, a spacious parking lot, and bustling
court yard where students anxiously awaited their civil procedure class. Importantly, the picture
I provided became dramatically more understandable when I added the purpose and activity
being conducted within the building. Until my description perfected an absolute image, the
description was merely a space. As the realm of possibilities narrowed, and the object became
clear, it obtained a “place.”
The space that can be derived from my description, though, is more complicated. Two
different formulations of space can be described from the example above – one physical and one
metaphysical. First and most apparent is the physical space that the brown building occupies in
reality – the physical domain that regardless of what sits upon it is a linear, measurable, and
calculable area.11
11

In such descriptions, the distinction between space and place are easily

See Igor Stramignoni, Francesco’s Devilish Venus: Notations on the Matter of Legal Space, 41 CAL. W.
L. REV. 147, 170 (2004).

associable as the space becomes a place when it is particularized or named as a location. Places
necessarily occupy spaces.
But there is a second way that space is implicated in the description of the brown
building above – a metaphysical description of space. Certainly, the meets and boundaries of the
law school can be used to define the physical space and certainly naming that boundary raises
the area to the notion of place. But the physical space is not the only way to describe Duke Law;
it can also be defined by the unseen, unbounded characteristics that move freely within physical
space. Specifically, Duke Law maintains a space defined by persons, ideas, and importantly
words – institutional space.12 Thus, the images that comprise Duke Law, its faculty, students,
alumni, clinics, institutes, ideas etc…. take up metaphysical space within various defining
communities.13 As those communities are named, the place maintained within the institutional
space becomes institutional place, definable like physical boundaries are defined. The area it
occupies can be identified by specific criteria and specific measurements that establish the
institutional characteristics of the space. For example, as ideas become normative, they obtain
institutional space.

12

One expression of this way of talking about normative space from the

See id.

[S]pace is each time the place resulting from a given institutional context (broadly
understood) – namely, a particular socio-political or linear-historical environment – rather
than, as noted earlier, a mute physical object that can be found “out-there” or even the
particular subjectivity that each time would go to express it. In a way, there is now a
mere shift of focus – from the institution of space (space as a thing or else space as the
thing of a subject) to space as an institution, individual or collective, historical or sociopolitical – yet such a shift is, in its different and progressively more and more abstract
versions of it, rather momentous.
A timely example of how institutional space differs from physical space is the displacement of
New Orleans law schools in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. Loyola New Orleans law school continued
operating in Houston outside of the physical boundaries of the city of New Orleans. The institutional space
was not compromised by the displacement of the law school, only the physical space.
13
Such relevant communities might be lawyers, the local community where the law school is located, the
University Community, the American Association of Law Schools, etc…

theological field is the Gospel writer Matthew’s identification of the Kingdom of Heaven as both
a physical place and a normative concept. 14 The common way of stating this is that the Kingdom
of Heaven is both a present reality (in the body of Jesus and the congregant of believers) and as a
hope yet to come (an aspirational norm that bounds current institutions).15 The conclusion
though to this is that ideas can be particularized or can be spatial, leaving to the imagination to
complete its formation.
Constitutional ideas start with a boundary already created. The words that are used to
describe Constitutional things begin from a context rich history of debate and discourse. But
within those boundaries, the place is still not necessarily defined. There is quite a lot of room to
define new things in the large open spaces of the Constitution.
B.

The Spaces and Places of Kelo

One obvious tension in the Kelo opinions is whether specifically named properties
(places) have specific meaning within the takings provisions. It is notable that within the
majority opinion, the property is described as very generic -- either “private property” “parcels”
14

Compare the following statements from the Gospel of Matthew:, Matthew 3:2 (“repent for the Kingdom
of Heaven is near”); 5:3 (“Blessed are the … for theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven”); 5:19 (“Anyone who
breaks the least of these commandments and teaches others to do the same will be called least in the
Kingdom of Heaven”); 5:20 (“you will certainly not enter the Kingdom of Heaven”); 11:12 (“the kingdom
of Heaven as been forcefully advancing”); 13:11 (“the knowledge and secrets of the Kingdom of Heaven
has been given to you”); 13:24 (“the Kingdom of Heaven is like a man who sewed good seed in his field”);
13:31 (“the Kingdom of Heaven is like a mustard seed”); 13:33 (“the Kingdom of Heaven is like yeast that
a woman took and mixed into a large amount of flour until it worked all through the dough”); 13:44 (“the
Kingdom of Heaven is like a treasure hidden in a field”); 13:45 (“the Kingdom of Heaven is like a merchant
looking for fine pearls”); 13:47 (“the Kingdom of Heaven is like a net that was let down into the lake”);
16:19 (“I will give you the keys to the Kingdom of Heaven”); 19:12 (“others have renounced marriage
because of the Kingdom of Heaven”).
15
Compare Stanley Hauerwas, THE PEACEABLE KINGDOM, 82 (1983) (“To begin to understand Jesus’s
announcement of the Kingdom, we must rid ourselves of the notion that the world we experience will exist
indefinitely. We must learn to see the world as Israel had learned to understand it – that is
eschatologically... to see it in terms of a story, with a beginning, a continuing drama, and an end”); with
RICHARD B. HAYS, THE MORAL VISION OF THE NEW TESTAMENT 322 (1996) (“In sum, the Kingdom of God
as figured forth in Matthew 5...offers a vision of radical counter cultural community of discipleship
characterized by a higher righteousness.”).

or “houses.”16

In contrast, Justice O’Connor’s dissent from the majority is filled with

compelling imagery designed to animate the properties and houses towards the specific
properties: instead of property, she talks about “homes.”17

Are these language variations

meaningful for understanding the takings jurisprudence or are they images that neither help nor
confuse the constitutional analysis?
In the same way that the descriptive tendencies of the majority and the dissenters are in
tension, the reflections of institutional space (the ideas of Constitutional takings and their
structures) are also at odds between the majority and the dissenters. I choose three concepts of
institutional space that are extractable from Kelo to describe how descriptions of physical and
institutional space define the takings problem: (1) the genre of the takings at issue; (2) the
definitions of public use and private use; and (3) the formulation of specific places as spaces.
1.

The Economic Development Genre

The early portions of the Kelo opinion tell us that this taking fits into the category of
“economic development.”18 By defining the genre of the taking as economic development, the
court identifies the space it will be working from within the Fifth Amendment. Perhaps just as
important, it eliminates other space that is not relevant to the discussion, such as regulatory
takings. Therein, the institutional space is narrowed to a specific subset – we move from
Constitutional to Fifth Amendment Takings to Economic Development Takings.
16

Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2658 (“In assembling the land needed for this project, the city’s development agent
has purchased property … to acquire the remainder of the property… the proposed disposition of the
property…); id. at 2659 (“parcel 1 is designated …”); id. at 2660 (“Sussette Kelo has lived in the Fort
Trumball area since 1997. She has made extensive improvements to her House”).
17
Id. at 2672.
18
The beginning line of the opinion sets the stage: “In 2000, the city of New London approved a
development…See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2658. Later in the opinion, the Court defines the question: “We
granted Certiorari to determine whether a city’s decision to take property for the purpose of economic
development satisfies the “public use” requirement of the Fifth Amendment.” Id. at 2661.

So, economic development space is defined by the community of authorities surrounding
it. First and foremost is the Fifth Amendment’s due process and takings clause: “No person …
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor shall private
property be taken, for public use without just compensation.”19

Next, the community of cases

that have been lumped together as constituting “economic development” help define the
boundaries of the genre. Specifically, the Court identifies three cases that describe the
boundaries of economic development.20 By identifying Kelo as economic development, the
Court thus finds the space in which the case is to be conceptualized within the overall scheme of
the Fifth Amendment.
Second, the name “economic development” carves out a space for what the court
perceives as happening in the case. The images that the words themselves proffer are defining
postures of improvement. Thus the descriptions employed by the majority to define the area to
be condemned bring to mind images of a well-worn, past its prime town. It uses the terms
“economically distressed city” and “distressed municipality” to create a dark overtone over the
city of New London.21 In contrast, the pictures of hope and improvement that economic

19

U.S. Const. Amend. V.
See Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2663. The court identifies Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (wherein the
court decided that a community development plan to erase slums from the Washington D.C. area was a
proper taking); Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (wherein the court decided that
the taking of land was necessary to overcome a history of land oligopoly in the state of Hawaii); and
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (wherein the court decided that pest control companies
could pay just compensation for trade secrets in the pesticide industry to remove entry barriers from the
market place) .
21
Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2658 (“In 2000, the city of New London approved a development plan that … was
“projected to create in excess of 1,000 jobs, to increase tax and other revenues, and to revitalize an
economically distressed city” (emphasis added); id. (“Decades of economic decline led a state agency in
1990 to designate the city a ‘distressed municipality.’); id. (“In 1998, the City’s unemployment rate was
nearly double that of the State”)
20

development creates instigates images of a “small urban village” with a riverwalk, shops and
restaurants.22 The new images cast a positive disposition over the future of the declining town.
This theme of contrasting distress with improvement is also seen in the community of
cases that Kelo sits with. In both Berman v. Parker and Midkiff v. Hawaii Housing Authority, the
relevant imagery is the contrast between a bad situation and improvement. The Court describes
the takings in Berman as “targeting a blighted” area of Washington D.C. The key words were
the desire for a “better balanced, more attractive community.”23 In Midkiff, the problem was a
“social and economic evil” in the form of a “land oligopoly.”24 In response, the Midkiff court
says that legislatively induced balance within the real estate market is an appropriate remedy for
the evil of land oligopoly.25 The vocabulary used by the Berman Court, the Midkiff Court, and
the Kelo Majority insight passionate images.

22

Blight, evil, and distressed are intended to stir

id. at 2659
Id. at 2663. Notably, the rhetoric of “slums” was used by the Berman court to describe the problems that
warranted a public purpose. As the court described, slums arose from “the overcrowding of dwellings, the
lack of parks, the lack of adequate streets and alleys, the absence of recreational areas, the lack of light and
air, the presence of outmoded street patterns.” Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 34 (1954). Moreover, the
presence of slums produced other social evils:
Miserable and disreputable housing conditions may do more than
spread disease and crime and immorality. They may also suffocate the
spirit by reducing the people who live there to the status of cattle. They
may indeed make living an almost insufferable burden. They may also
be an ugly sore, a blight on the community which robs it of charm,
which makes it a place from which men turn. The misery of housing
may despoil a community as an open sewer may ruin a river
Berman, 348 U.S. at 32.
24
Kelo, 125 S.Ct at 2663. Midkiff’s imagery is not the warning that slums or economic decline may have
for a community, but the evils associated with kings and crowns. The court’s association of land ownership
patterns in Hawaii and the American struggle for Independence is particularly captivating. See Midkiff, 467
U.S. 229, 242 (1984) (“the people of Hawaii have attempted, much as the settlers of the original 13 colonies
did, to reduce the perceived social and economic evils of a land oligopoly traceable to their monarchs”).
Like the American Colonists who tore off the bonds of tyranny that similar land feudal systems represented,
the Hawaiian’s were attempting to do the same.
25
Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 2330 (“Redistribution of fees simple to correct deficiencies in the market determined
by the state legislature to be attributable to land oligopoly is a rational exercise of the eminent domain
power.”).
23

responses.

Equally important are the responses that define the action being undertaken:

“balance,” “opportunity,” and “revitalization.”
The dialogue between the majority and the dissenters regarding this aspect of the case
highlights the tension between defining institutional space. On the one hand, the O’Connor led
dissent wants to show that the standard of betterment weakens the jurisprudence because any
property can be taken on its potential to be better.26 Akin to this claim, O’Connor wants to show
that particular properties can be distinguished from generic spaces.
New London does not claim that Sussette Kelo’s and Wilhelmnina
Dery’s well-maintained homes are the source of any social harm.
Indeed, it could not so claim without adopting the absurd argument
that any single-family home that might be razed to make way for
an apartment building or any church that might be replaced with a
retail store, or any small business that might be more lucrative if it
were instead part of a national franchise, is inherently harmful to
society and thus within the government’s power to condemn.27
Specifically, the types of properties are homes that are cared for, like Ms. Kelo’s home. They
have an aesthetic quality that makes them different from the property in the Berman case (a
department store) and the property in the Midkiff case (tracts of land).
This is precisely where the majority is able to quibble with O’Connor’s viewpoint. The
majority in a footnote states “Nor do our cases support Justice O’Connor’s novel theory that the
government may only take property and transfer it to private parties when the initial taking
eliminates some ‘harmful property use.’ There was nothing harmful about the non-blighted
department store at issue in Berman…”28 In this small bite, court shows us how place defines or
26
Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2675 (“But nearly any lawful use of real private property can be said to generate some
incidental benefit to the public.”).
27
Id. at 2675.
28
Id. at 2666 n.16. For a detailed discussion of “Betterment” as institutional space, see infra subsection
B(2)(a).

doesn’t define the constitutional question. Like Mr. Berman’s department store, Ms. Kelo’s
property is well-kept; unlike Mr. Berman’s store, her property is a home.29 Does this make a
difference? No, says the majority, because takings have nothing to do with how well a property
is maintained or to what use the property is put. The Court says: “In each case, the public
purpose we upheld depended on a private party’s future use of the concededly non-harmful
property that was taken. By focussing on a future use, as opposed to its past use [or current
condition], our cases are faithful to the text of the Takings Clause.”30 Thus, the majority has
oriented the reader with one defining sentence, describing the boundaries that economic
development takings occupy as institutional space: (1) they are purpose oriented; (2)

as

described by other economic development cases; and (3) are bound within the Takings clause of
the Fifth Amendment.
b.

Defining public and private use

The next institutional space that Kelo overlaps is a question of how we constitutionally
define a public and private use. The majority notes that public use can be defined by specific
“place;” certainly takings that are for the construction of public buildings or for common carriers
satisfy a public use.31 Equally clear is that the taking for the purpose of conferring a “purely
private benefit on a particular private party” is forbidden.32 The court has again defined the
boundaries about which the space we are operating in is determined. The court then narrows
those boundaries. First it notes that the development plan by the city is not one intended to
29

For a more detailed discussion of Home as a definer of space, see infra subsection B(2)(c).
Id. at 2666 n. 16.
31
Id. at 2661.
32
Id. citing Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 245 (“A purely private taking could not withstand the scrutiny of the public
use requirement”); and Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896). The court further
expounds this limitation noting that the city could not take property under the pretext of a public use if the
actual purpose was to bestow a private benefit. Id.
30

benefit a particular class of individuals. But then it notes that the land to be condemned is not to
be opened up to the public at large.33 Thus, the court defines the problem as setting that problem
within an area of interpretation that rests between two polar opposites, which if either were true,
would determine the result of the case. Then, looking to the community of decisions surrounding
this question, the court determines that this taking in particular suffices as a public use and
therefore is appropriate.34
And its this way of defining the public use /private use dichotomy that the dissenters are
most concerned with: “to reason, as the court does, that the incidental public benefits resulting
from the subsequent ordinary use of private property render economic development takings ‘for
public use’ is to wash out any distinction between private and public use of property – and
thereby effectively to delete the words ‘for public use’ from the takings clause of the Fifth
Amendment.”35

After differentiating why Kelo was different from Berman and Midkiff,

O’Connor writes:
Yet for all the emphasis on deference, Berman and Midkiff hewed
to a bedrock principle without which our public use jurisprudence
would collapse: “a purely private taking could not withstand the
scrutiny of the public use requirement; it would serve no legitimate
purpose of government and would thus be void. To protect that
principle, those decisions reserved “a role for courts to play in
reviewing a legislature’s judgment of what constitutes a public
use…[though] the Court in Berman made clear that it is an
‘extremely narrow one.36
Importantly, O’Connor’s dissent suggests that a primary role of the Court is to define
Constitutional terms:
33
34
35
36

Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2671.
Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2674 (O’Connor, J. Dissenting).

We give considerable deference to legislatures’ determination
about what governmental activities will advantage the public. But
were the political branches the sole arbiters of the public-private
distinction, the Public Use Clause would amount to little more than
horatory fluff. An external, judicial check on how the public use
requirement is interpreted, however limited, is necessary if this
constraint on government power is to retain any meaning.37
One might notice that the disagreement between the majority and the dissent is not based on
what is or what is not a public use. Rather, the institutional space this discussion occupies is
whether the court is in the best position to define public use beyond its prior statements.
It may be worth noting that Courts engage in defining exercises all the time.

For

example, the Court defined the meaning of privacy from the Constitution, some would say out of
thin air. One explanation for the court’s hesitancy to define public use in tangible terms is the
difficulty in defining terms and things in inconsistent ways. “Public use” is much more pliable
and susceptible as an abstract concept than as a concretely defined term. I can feel a road, see it,

37

Id. at 2673. There is also a sense in which O’Connor is regretful over the language she used in Midkiff.
There is a sense in which this troubling result follows from errant
language in Berman and Midkiff. In discussing whether takings within
a blighted neighbourhood were for a public use, Berman began by
observing “We deal, in other words with what traditionally has been
known as the police power.” From there it declared that “once the
object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it through
the exercise of eminent domain is clear. Following up, [I for] we said
in Midkiff that “the ‘public use’ requirement is coterminous with the
scope of a sovereign’s police powers.” This language was unnecessary
to the specific holdings of those decisions. Berman and Midkiff simply
did not put such language to the constitutional test, because the takings
in those cases were within the police power but also for “public use” for
the reasons I have described. The case before us now demonstrates
why, when deciding if a taking’s purpose is constitutional, the police
power and “public use” cannot always be equated.
Id. at 2673. Notably, the Court does not even mention the words “police power” within
its opinion. Its obvious to O’Connor that the Police Power is somehow implicated by the
majority’s decision. Is there meaning behind the majority’s failure to define this case as
following within the police power? Is it merely a case that omitted its raison de etet. Or
is the Police Power lurking behind other definitions, still present, imagined, but not
stated? It seems O’Connor thinks so.

and therefore gain experiential knowledge that its in front of me. The “public use” the court
defines exists outside of such empirical datum – it is to a certain degree elusive, which makes it
more adaptable.
I am carefully choosing my words. I do not want to write that the court is activist
(whatever that means) or even that Kelo was incorrectly decided (which may or may not be true).
What I do want to communicate is the way the court used abstraction to reach the meaning of
the Fifth Amendment’s takings clause that it wanted to reach, particularly its refusal to isolate a
specific place within the institutional space that is public use.
3.

Physical Places as Institutional Spaces

To this point, we have only described how place and space contrast each other to create a
definitional dichotomy defining economic development and public use. One final example is the
recasting of physical place by the dissenters as institutional space. One foremost example is
Justice Thomas’s description of the home. Thomas writes: “The Court has elsewhere recognized
‘the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions
since the origins of the republic,’ when the issue is only whether the government may search a
home.”38

He continues describing the meaning of the Kelo opinion with the Court’s previous

stance: “Though citizens are safe from the government in their homes, the homes themselves are
not.”39 Thomas’s “Home” becomes definitional towards the liberties individuals can expect and
must be read to consistently protect those liberties. Thomas’s argument said slightly more
argumentatively might go something like this: “how can the Home safeguard citizens within the
meaning of the fourth amendment if it can be seized under the Fifth Amendment. Thus for
38
39

Id. at 2685
Id.

Thomas, the institutional space of the Home as read through the Fourth Amendment must
continue through the Fifth (and arguably the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, etc…).
Thomas has a point only if you accept his initial conclusion that words should be
consistently defined every time they are used. We know that this is not always the case within
the realm of Constitutional interpretation.

For example, the first seventy-one years of our

country saw different legal definitions of the word person: it could mean all people, black and
white, male and female (such as in the criminal law); or all white people (such as in
Constitutional Law); or all white male people (such as in voting public). One could argue back
to Thomas that the Court historically has no problem with inconsistency of terms.
A second example of place becoming institutional space is the O’Connor use of labelling.
One example of this labelling flows from the possibilities that O’Connor envisions occurring to
any property: “The spectre of condemnation hangs over all property. Nothing is to prevent the
State from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping mall, or any
farm with a factory.”40 O’Connor uses the idea of what a “Ritz Carlton” replacing a “Motel 6”
symbolizes. This can also be seen by O’Connor use of the word “home” to describe Sussette
Kelo’s property. She wants to use places to define the boundaries of property by the images
people imagine – by “Motel 6’s,” “Ritz-Carltons,” and “homes.” Thus, for the community of
economic developments, the concept of home is more important than any single manifestation of
it.41
***
One point that can be made in reviewing the three examples of the use of institutional
space is the tension that exists between defining things and defining concepts. Just as Thomas
40

Id. at 2676.
One might also recall O’Connor’s earlier First Amendment opinion in Frisby v. Schultz, where the
rhetoric of the Home is also described. 487 U.S. 474 (1988).

41

wants “homes” to be “homes,” Stevens would rather talk about public and private uses. The
court’s hesitancy in Kelo to define “things” may reflect the abstract nature of our Constitution. In
the example of Kelo, private things can be made public so long as the boundaries of the space
they occupy permit it to be so defined. And yet, there is a certain discomfort we feel when the
Court uses words that mean one thing as if they mean the opposite.42 To this point, my initial
discussion of the nature of words creating images becomes relevant. If words can create different
images for different people, we should have no problem with a court that uses a word one way in
one context and another in a different context. If institutional surroundings conjure different
images to different persons, then the words are only as relevant as the person who is using or
interpreting the words – in this case five justices that thought private use can sometimes mean
public use.
A second related point is that even when the court may not be engaged in defining things,
it is perpetually engaging in institutional definition, defining the ways cases should be thought
about by outsiders. James Boyd White’s insightful comments reach this point: “In each case,
the court is saying not only ‘This is the right outcome for this case,’ but also, ‘this is the right
way to think and talk about this case, and others like it.’”43 The conclusion one might draw from
this discussion is that the court is steering constitutional law interpretation towards abstraction.
Another viable conclusion is that the court abstracts definitions when the institutional space
which the object occupies (this time economic development takings) requires abstraction.
Which ever mode you choose to rest upon, the court decides and defines by its own words what
the channels of discussion will look like: it sets our imagination.
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See STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND 105 (2001) (“The Judge, no
less than others, is enmeshed in and dependent upon the structures of social meaning that make
communication possible... Imagination is systematic and orderly rather than chaotic or anarchic”).
43
James Boyd White, What’s an Opinion For, 62 U. CHIC. L. REV. 1363, 1366-67 (1995).

C.

Interpreting the wave Defining Space and Place in the Constitution.

At the end of Part A, I said that “there is quite a lot of room to define new things in the
large open spaces of the Constitution.” What I meant was that the boundaries of the Constitution
itself are relatively open, leaving much for specification. I now want to put forward my theory
of how space is defined in the Constitution, using economic development takings as my
illustration. I will do so visually as well as verbally.
The Constitution starts with a set of ideas contained by words. The specific words that
we are concerned with are the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause “No person … shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor shall private property be
taken, for public use without just compensation.”44

The central question then, for economic

development takings issues is what constitutes public purpose. If the idea
is a constitutional idea,
Public Purpose
Idea

Constitutional
Ideas
Figure 1
then the large box represents the whole universe of

Fifth Amendment
Ideas

Fig. 1
Constitutional ideas, the box inside of it represents fifth amendment takings problems, and the
box inside of that represents the idea of a public purpose. (Figure 1). We are working strictly
inside the public purpose box. If we were to illustrate this by drawing our box with two halves,
one side would be physical manifestation of ideas, and the other would be institutional
expression. The line dividing the two is the words. (Figure 2).
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In defining the idea of the public purpose before Berman, the Court talked about things. It talked
about buildings, roads, and parks. Thus, the physical manifestation of the idea grew. (Figure 3).

THE
IDEA

Physical Manifestation

Institutional Manifestation

Figure 3
Notice that the space in which the physical manifestation of the idea grows while the
institutional manifestation shrinks.

Note also, though that the institutional idea does not

disappear. Rather, the physical manifestation of the idea predominates. This is the space that
takings operate in pre-Berman.

After Berman and Midkiff

the space begins to move the

opposite direction. Thus the curve is reversed. (Figure 4).
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My argument is that what the dissent and the majority argue about in Kelo is the placement of
the line separating physical and institutional manifestations – specifically, the direction of the
swing that separates institutional manifestations of ideas from the physical. That is, they argue
whether the words should create more physical spaces bound by physical descriptions – public
buildings, roads, etc... – or whether those word should represent spaces that are ideas.
At the same time, as the diagrams above show, the reality remains that all we are talking
about is ideas. The physical places are simply ideas themselves. O’Connor’s and Thomas’s
description of the home is more about an idea of what the home is about or what it should protect
than it is about a physical location called home.

In this sense, the images created by

constitutional language tends to define what the parameters of the Constitution is supposed to
inhere to.

CONCLUSION
I started this essay by describing how language creates images. I conclude this essay by
suggesting that language employed by courts creates institutional images that either result in a
concrete manifestation of constitutional norms or constitutional ideas. Perhaps the descriptive
tendencies of courts (such as O’Connor’s conceptualization of home or her use of institutional
images of hotels) are just as important for interpreting the cases as the results themselves. But
more likely, the Court’s conclusion leaves us with the uneasy feeling that all the Court is really
talking about is ideas.

